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Legislation Concerning Alibis, Perjury, Self-Incrimination Immunity,
Official Conduct, and Grand Juries
The Chicago Crime Commission, an independent citizen's committee,
which has long been a vital force in combatting criminal activity in
Chicago and Illinois, has recently sponsored five bills designed to im-
prove the administration of criminal justice in Illinois. Concerned
almost entirely with problems of criminal investigation and prosecution,
the bills deal with alibis, providing for advance notice of intention to use
alibi defenses; perjury, obviating the necessity of proving which of two
contradictory statements is true; self-incrimination immunity, giving the
court power to grant immunity from prosecution to material witnesses;
official conduct, penalizing a public officer who refuses to waive his im-
munity when being investigated; and grand juries, providing in effect
for extending the life of grand juries in Cook County.
. None of these proposed statutes contain any startling innovations--
most are similar to legislation which has already been adopted in other
jurisdictions, tested, and proved satisfactory. As is obvious from a
glance, they are mainly aimed at strengthening the hand of the prose-
cution in criminal cases. Despite the fact that some of these bills will
receive opposition from those members of the bar who make a practice
of taking defendants' cases in criminal prosecutions, it must be noted
that none place undue advantages in the hands of the prosecution. All
are drawn with the fundamental aim of improving the chances of ulti-
mate justice in criminal cases-certainly a laudable objective. This will
become more apparent as the bills themselves are studied. Each of the
five proposed statutes is analyzed and discussed in this paper with full
treatment of both the policy arguments and the legal problems which
may arise.
The Alibi Bill
In many criminal cases, an otherwise air-tight prosecution is defeated
when the defendant produces at the close of his case alibi testimony, pur-
porting to establish his presence at a place other than that where the
crime was committed. Often the prosecution is unable to effectively rebut
this evidence, and the alibi defense results in a verdict of acquittal for
the defendant. Obviously, in the final minutes of trial, the prosecution
will not have an opportunity to verify the alibi testimony or to produce
direct rebutting testimony. In most instances trial strategy would dictate
against a request for continuance by the prosecution even assuming that
such a request would be granted. To prevent this surprise, an alibi
statute is proposed which would require the defendant, whenever he
proposes to offer in his defense testimony to establish an abili, to pro-
vide the prosecuting attorney before the trial with a written notice of
his intention to assert such alibi. The notice must include specific infor-
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mation as to the place where the accused maintains he was at the time
of the offense. If the defendant fails to file such notice, then the court
is empowered to exclude alibi evidence offered by the defendant if it ap-
pears to the court that such evidence takes the state by surprise.1 The
proposed bill reads as follows:
"Whenever a defendant in a criminal cause shall propose to offer
in his defense, testimony to establish an alibi, such defendant shall,
not less than eight days before the trial of such cause, file and serve
upon the prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of his intention
to assert such alibi, which notice shall include specific information
as to the place where the accused maintains he was at the time of
the alleged offense. The defendant shall not be permitted to intro-
duce evidence inconsistent with such notice unless the court for good
cause permits the notice to be amended. In the event of the failure
of a defendant to file the written notice in this section prescribed,
the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant for the
purpose of proving an alibi, if it appears to the court that such evi-
dence takes the state by surprise.
"Provided, however, that in the event the time and place of the
offense are not specifically stated in the complaint, indictment or in-
formation, on application of the defendant not less than eight days
before the trial of such cause that the time and place be definitely
stated in order to enable him to offer evidence to establish an alibi,
the court shall direct the prosecuting attorney to serve a written
notice upon the defendant not less than five days before the trial of
such cause so stating the time and place of the offense, and thereafter
the defendant shall give the notice above provided not less than two
days before the trial of such cause if he proposes to offer evidence
to establish an alibi. In the event the time or place of the offense
has not been specifically stated in the complaint, indictment or in-
formation, and the court directs that written notice be given by the
prosecuting attorney, as above provided, and the prosecuting attor-
ney advises the court that he cannot safely do so on the facts as he
has been informed concerning them, or if in the progress of the trial
the evidence discloses a time or place of the offense other than
alleged, the defendant may, without having given the notice above
mentioned, offer evidence for the purpose of establishing an alibi."
There can be no argument against this bill on the basis of improving
criminal justice and effective law enforcement. Its provisions can have
no harmful effect on a valid alibi defense, and it will provide substantial
protection against "manufactured" alibis. In other jurisdictions where
this type of statute has been enacted, law enforcement officers have re-
ported gratifying results.2 There are, however, some interesting legal
problems which arise from a consideration of the bill.
1 A similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives of the Illinois
State Legislature during the 1947 session. It was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee, and defeated therein.
2 Attorney General of New York Urges Criminal Law Reform (1931) 9 The Panel
45, 46: "In fact, the experience of Ohio and Michigan has been that the alibi is
seldom used now as a defense. In those states, since the enactment of their alibi
laws, there has been an increase in convictions, and a corresponding decrease in per-
jured testimony." See Esch, Ohio's New '"Alibi Defense" Law (1931) 9 The Panel
42; Toy, Michigan Law on Alibi and Insanity Defenses Reduces Perjury (1931) 9
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From a constitutional basis, an alibi statute would be clearly valid. It
merely imposes a condition upon the defendant's taking advantage of
his right to testify in his own behalf.3 If the defendant provides the
notice, he will offer evidence which will tend to clear him. If he does
not give notice or use an alibi, then he does not thereby confess his pres-
ence at the place where the crime was committed-this latter fact must
still be proved by the prosecution. The bill can be viewed as imposing a
"pleading" requirement, making the defendant -lay a pre-trial founda-
tion in order to prove an alibi.4 In this view, the requirement is analo-
gous to the common law requirement of a special plea in order to show
former conviction, former acquittal, or pardon.5 In no instance is the
defendant required to testify-he is only required to give advance notice
of his intention to testify.6
The scope of the requirement was limited under a similar New York
statute, when the court held that the statute would not be applicable if
the defendant himself desired to testify concerning an alibi defense. 7
The court arrived at this result by noting that the language of the act
was not expressly clear on this point, and to construe it so as to require
notice when the defendant himself testifies would be to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial by denying his privilege of testifying in his
own behalf in a criminal prosecution. It is difficult to read the statute
as exempting the defendant from the requirement, and it is more difficult
to accept the court's reasoning for so doing. As has been pointed out
above, the statute merely imposes a condition on the defendant's testify-
ing.8 Furthermore, the right to testify in his own behalf is accorded to
the defendant in both New York and Illinois by statute.9 The right was
not recognized at common law. Certainly it is valid to reason that what
the legislature has in its power to confer by statute, it can limit by
The Panel 52; Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases (1934) 20
A.B.A.J. 435. This type of statute has been enacted by fourteen states. Arizona
Code Ann. (1939) §44-1031; Indiana, Burns Stat. Ann. (1933) §9-1631, 2, 3; Iowa
Code (1946) §777.18; Kansas Gen. Stat. (Corrick 1935) §62-1341; Michigan Stat.
Ann. (1935) §28.1043 (amended, 1947 supp.); Minnesota Stat. (Mason 1945) §630.14;
New Jersey Stat. Ann. (1939) §2:190-7, 8; New York Code Crim. Proc. §295-L;
Ohio Code Ann. (Page 1939) §13444-20; Oklahoma Stat. (1941) t. 22, §585; South
Dakota Code (1939) §34.2801; Utah Code Ann. (1942) §105-22-17; Vermont, Acts
1939, No. 53; Wisconsin, Supreme Court Order, Stat. 1941, §355.085.
3 See Note (1941) 15 St. John's L. Rev. 304; Note (1941) 10 Fordham L. Rev. 305.
4 Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 849.
5 Ibid.
6 These arguments based on constitutional grounds have been advanced in other
jurisdictions when alibi statutes were questioned in the courts. In no instance, how-
ever, have the statutes been held unconstitutional. People v. Schade, 292 N. Y. S. 612
(1936) (alibi statute held constitutional in face of objection that it forced the de-
fendant to testify against himself); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio 1, 176 N. E. 656
(1931) (Ohio alibi statute held constitutional). The statutes have, in other cases,
been impliedly held constitutional by being accepted by the Supreme Court of the
state without objection. State v. Carter, 149 Kan. 295, 87 P. (2d) 818 (1939) ; State
v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. (2d) 647 (1937); People v. Wudarski, 253 Mich. 83, 234
N. W. 157 (1931). The invalidity of the constitutional argument is ably presented in
Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 849;
Burdick, Criminal Justice in America (1925) 11 A.B.A.J. 510, 512; Willoughby,
Principles of Judicial Administration (1929) 450-451.
7 State v. Rakiec, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (1940).
8 The fallaciousness of the arguments presented by the court in the Rakiec case is
shown in Note (1941) 10 Fordham L. Rev. 305.
9 Illinois, Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. (1935) c. 38, §734. This statute is in derogation
of the common law. See Note (1941) 10 Fordham L. Rev. 305.
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statute. The defendant is in no way deprived of his right to a fair trial.
There are other instances in criminal law where if the defendant does
not make a pre-trial assertion of a right or defense he is thereafter pre-
cluded from taking advantage of it.1O In view of these considerations, it
is to be hoped that the Illinois court will not so construe the present act.
The second section of the statute makes allowance for the situations
which may arise when either the indictment does not state a definite time
and place for the commission of the offense, or where there is variance,
non-fatal, between the proof of time and place and that alleged in the
indictment. In the former situation, the prosecution can be required to
serve on the defendant a notice specifying the time and place with par-
ticularity. If he does not do so, or if the proof varies from the indictment,
then the defendant is not required to give prior notice of an alibi de-
fense. 11 Similar provisions exist in other jurisdictions which have
adopted an alibi statute.12 This makes the bill fairer to the defendant,
and is a decided improvement over the original form of the bill, intro-
duced at the last session of the Illinois legislature, which made no allow-
ance for such a situation.
The statute now proposed is less exacting than the bill proposed by
the Crime Commission and submitted to the legislature in 1947.13 Orig-
inally, the defendant was required to furnish the prosecution in his notice
of alibi defense a list of the names and addresses of witnesses by whom
he proposed to prove his alibi. Such a provision gives the prosecution a
much better chance to disprove fabricated alibis. The desirability of
such a provision has been questioned on the ground that it would enable
the police and prosecution officials to intimidate the defendant's wit-
nesses in advance of trial. Such an argument is certain to be made by
those members of the bar who specialize in defense work. It is thought,
however, that the danger of such intimidation is over-emphasized, and
that the advantages to be gained from a more stringent statute would
outweigh the possibilities of abuse by prosecution officials. Of the four-
teen jurisdictions which now have the alibi statute, six require the list
of names and addresses to be furnished by the defendant.1
4
One further problem which may arise in the use of this statute would
be the right of the prosecution to comment to the jury when the de-
fendant gives notice of intention to produce an alibi but does not do so
at the trial. To allow the prosecution to make use of this fact in his
argument to the jury would obviously be prejudicial to the defendant.
Such comment may well be prohibited by the ban on any comment by
the prosecution on the failure of the defendant to testify in his own
1o E.g., Motion to suppress illegally seized evidence (see United States v. Segurola,
275 U. S. 106 (1927)) ; motion to produce involuntary confession (see Note (1947)
38 J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 249).
11 See text at note 1 supra.
12 Indiana (Burns Supp. 1942, §9-1631) requires a counter notice by the prosecu-
tion if the time alleged by the state becomes different than that stated in the indict-
ment; Kansas Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1935) §62-1341 provides that if the prosecution
does not supply the time proven at the trial, then no alibi notice will be required.
See State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931).
13 See note 1 supra.
14 Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York. For statutory cita-
tions, see note 2 supra.
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behalf,1 5 a view which was taken in an Ohio case arising out of a similar
statute.'6
The bill as it now exists will be a valuable addition to Illinois criminal
procedure. Imposing no unfair burden on the defendant, it will lessen the
chances of a guilty defendant making use of a perjured alibi to evade
conviction. On the other hand, it cannot harm the defendant who has a
legitimate alibi defense. The bill will aid in the movement to make crim-
inal prosecutions less an arena for the "jousting of advocates" and more
an impartial and searching inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The Perjury Bill
"Hundreds of persons perjure themselves in the courts every day
except Sunday . . .there is an agreement that perjury is rampant, and
that, as a general rule what happens to perjurers is nothing. "17 To
rpmedy this situation, so often decried by legal writers on the subject,'8
a bill has been proposed which will make it much easier to obtain a per-
jury conviction in Illinois.1 9 The bill leaves unchanged the previously
existing definition of perjury, which is to swear or affirm wilfully, cor-
ruptly, and falsely, under oath, in a matter material to the issue in point
or in question.20 However, the proposed Bill provides that:
"In every indictment for perjury or subornation of perjury, it
shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged
upon the defendant, and before what court or authority the oath or
affirmation was taken, averring such court or authority to have had
full power to administer the same, .together with the proper aver-
ments, -except as hereinafter otherwise provided, to falsify the
matter wherein the perjury is assigned, without setting forth
any part of the records or proceedings, either in law or equity,
other than as aforesaid, and without setting forth the com-
mission or authority of the court or other authority before whom the
perjury was committed, or the form of the oath or affirmation, or
the manner of administering the same; provided, that in every in-
dictment for perjury based upon the giving of contradictory testi-
mony or the making of contradictory statements under oath on
occasions in which an oath is required by law, it shall be suf-
ficient to allege the making of such contradictory statements or the
giving of such contradictory testimony, without alleging which
statement is true, or which is false.
In any prosecution for perjury based upon an indictment alleg-
ing the making of contradictory statements or the giving of contra-
dictory testimony, falsity shall be presumptively established by
proof that the defendant has given such testimony or made such
statements under oath on occasions in which an oath is required
by law,-without proving which statement or testimony is true, or
15 This is prohibited in Illinois by statute. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. (1935) C., 38 §758.
16 State v. Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, 55 N. E. (2d) 430 (1943) (prejudicial error
to comment on failure to prove alibi when notice was given). For a discussion of
this problem, see Note (1935) 26 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 454.
17 McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727, 728.
18 See Note (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 901; Boston, Drastic Changes in
Law Necessary to Curb Perjury in Our Courts (1935) 13 The Panel 6.
19 This bill in modified form was introduced in the 1947 session of the legislature,
but was defeated in the House Judiciary Committee.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §473.
1949]
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which is false; provided, however, that where such contradictory
testimony is in the same trial and is the result of the breaking down
of the direct testimony by cross-examination, there shall be no such
presumption '"2 1 (New matter italicized.)
The effect of the bill is to make it possible to convict for perjury by
alleging and proving contradictory statements under oath, eliminating
the necessity of proving which statement is false. There can be no doubt
that the now existing requirement that the truth be alleged and proved
has caused a paucity of perjury convictions. 22 That a statute such as
the proposed one would be a material aid in stopping the prevalent
practice of court-room perjury cannot be doubted.23
The practical argument made against this proposed change in the law
governing perjury is that an individual would be very reluctant to
change his testimony if he had testified falsely or in error on one occa-
sion and wanted to testify to the truth at a later time. It is reasonable
to suppose that no one will be indicted because of an honest change in
testimony; furthermore the usual situation is where a witness recants
previously given truthful testimony. The bill merely raises a presump-
tion in favor of the prosecution, and allows the defendant to explain in
whatever manner he can his change in testimony. Certainly if the de-
fendant has in fact wilfully testified falsely, there is no valid reason why
he should not be prosecuted. It must be noted that the prosecution even
under this proposed statute would still have the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption aids in
establishing this burden, but does not force the defendant to prove his
innocence beyond doubt.
This bill in similar form was introduced and defeated in the legisla-
ture during the 1947 session, and has been changed in the interim. As
originally written, the bill provided that proof of contradictory state-
ments would raise a presumption of perjury, rather than a presumption
of falsity. This previous wording would have made it possible to avoid
proving the other elements of the crime of perjury-i.e., wilfulness, cor-
ruptness, and materiality. The change from presumption of perjury to
presumption of falsity removes the constitutional objection that the
presumption might be invalid as violating due process of law.24 Similar
21 The proposed bill is, in form, an amendment to Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 38, §484.
One change proposed to the bill when it was introduced in the legislature in 1947
would limit the contradictory statements provisions to the trial of any civil or
criminal case in a court of record or in any grand jury proceeding. This would need-
lessly limit the scope of the statute; perjury by contradictory statements should be
as broad in its application as ordinary perjury.
22 Illinois, along with the majority of jurisdictions, now requires that the falsity
of the testimony must be established by two credible witnesses, or by one witness if
corroborated by other independent circumstances. People v. Alkire, 321 111. 28, 151
N. E. 518 (1926). No jurisdictions have held in the absence of statute that proof of
contradictory statements is sufficient to establish perjury, although some have stated
that such proof is sufficient if it is corroborated by some circumstantial evidence.
Horn v. State, 186 Miss. 455, 191 So. 282 (1939). For a discussion of these views,
see 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2041; Note (1941) 28 Va. L. Rev. 102.
23 See Boston, Drastic Change in Law Necessary to Curb Perjury in Our Courts
(1935) 13 The Panel 6. Similar statutes now exist in New York, New Jersey, and
Utah. See note 24 infra.
24 In order for a presumption established by statute to be considered constitutional
and not violate the requirements of "due process" there must be a rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. Casey v. United States,
276 U. S. 413 (1928) ; People V. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865 (1908) (issuance
[VOL 39
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statutes existing in other states have not gone beyond the point of
allowing proof of contradictory statements to establish the requirement
of falsity.25
A constitutional argument made against the bill as it now stands is
that, since the indictment would allege two contradictory statements
without stating which is true or which is false, the allegation would be-
in the disjunctive or alternative and would thus not sufficiently inform
the accused of the charge against him. 26 It is true that an allegation
in the disjunctive or alternative was invalid at common law,27 and it
might be argued that the same invalidity attached to the requirement
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused should be sufficiently in-
formed of the charge against him. However, this bill does not provide
for disjunctive or alternative statements in the sense used at common
law. The accused is not charged with one crime or another crime. He is
accurately informed of precisely what he is to meet at the trial. This
view was upheld by a New Jersey court which held constitutional a
statute providing that in any perjury indictment, contradictory state-
ments may be alleged, and their proof at the trial would raise a presump-
tion of falsity2 8 The court also stated that the statute did not impose
an unconstitutional burden on the defendant by making contradictory
statements when proved a prima facie case for the prosecution.2 9 The
jury must still be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the falsity and
wilfulness of the statements, and the burden of proof is not shifted.
The arguments for the proposed statute on a policy level are com-
pelling reasons for its adoption. The opposing view has been well stated:
"The obligation of protecting witnesses from oppression, or annoyance,
by charges, or threats of charges of having borne false testimony, is far
paramount to that of giving even perjury its" desserts. "8 0 Or, as stated
of internal revenue stamp statutory prima facie evidence of the sale of intoxicating
liquors; held constitutional); People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593, 137 N. E. 454 (1922)
(presumption of Illinois act that possession of intoxicating liquors means that such
liquor is presumed to be kept for sale or other disposal in violation of the Act held
constitutional). If proof of contradictory statements raised a presumption of per-
jury, it could not logically be said that such proof reasonably tends to raise an infer-
ence of wilfulness, corruptness, or materiality. The established fact does not tend to
raise an inference of the main fact.
25 The New York Statute (New York Penal Code, §1627) provides that in prose-
cutions for first degree perjury, the falsity of the statements shall be presumptively
established by proof of contradictory statements. It is only for second degree per-
jury that the crime is presumptively established by proof of the contradictory state-
ments. However, second degree perjury as a crime does not include the requirement
of materiality, and wilfulness still need be proved even with the presumption. Utah
has a statute exactly the same as New York. Utah Code Ann. §103-43-14. The New
Jersey Statute (1N.J. stat. Ann. (1939) §§2:157-4 to 2:157-8) provides only that in
prosecutions for "tfalse swearing" the falsity of the statement shall be prima facie
established by proof of contradictory statements.
26 On the basis of this argument, the Illinois Bar Association disapproved the per-jury bill proposed in the 1947 session of the Legislature.
27 Cohn v. Graber, 194 N. Y. S. 233 (1922). See Hankin, Alternative and Hypo-thetical Pleadings (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 365.
28 State v. Ellenstein, 121 N. J. I,. 304, 2 A. (2d) 454 (1938). The New York
statute has been held constitutional. People v. Glass, 181 N. Y. S. 547 (1920) ; People
v. Caifa, 299 N. Y. S. 838 (1937).
29 State v. Bllenstein, 121 N. J. L. 304, 2 A. (2d) 454 (1938). See State v. Harris,
132 N.J.L. 54, 38 A. (2d) 686 (1944).
30 Best, Evidence (12th ed. 1922) 522. Greenleaf states that proof of contradic-
tory statements is not and should not be perjury. 1 Gieenleaf, Evidence (1st ed.
1842) §259. However, Wigmore appears to favor such a statute. 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence (3rd ed. 1940) §2041.
1949)
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by one court: "This inducement (to tell the truth) would be destroyed
if a witness could not correct a false statement, except by running the
risk of being indicted and convicted for perjury.' ' 1 It is submitted
that these fears are somewhat exaggerated. On the other side is the
alarming situation that perjury is estimated to be present in 50% of
contested civil cases, 75% of criminal cases, and 90% of divorce cases.32
Perjury remains one of the most difficult crimes to establish within the
law and to the satisfaction of juries. It is believed that the proposed
change in the Illinois law would be an invaluable asset to lessening the
prevalance of perjury in the courts, and would not substantially endan-
ger the honest witness. For a dishonest witness, there need be no
concern.
The Official Conduct Bill
This bill, probably the most controversial, is designed to remove the
impediment to investigation which is imposed by the constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. 33 At present, a public official when called
before a grand jury which is investigating his conduct or his office, can
refuse to testify on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate
him, and still hold his office. To overcome this handicap to efficient public
investigation, a statute is proposed which provides that any person
holding public office, trust, or employment who refuses to testify upon
matters relating to his office on the ground that such answer might tend to
incriminate him shall forfeit his office and shall be disqualified there-
after from holding any public office, trust, or employment, for a period
of five years.34 The statutory proposal is as follows:
"Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive
public office, trust or employment (whether state, county or munici-
pal) who refuses to testify upon matters relating to said office, trust
or employment in any proceeding wherein such person is a defendant
or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution (whether such
proceeding is criminal, quasi criminal or before a trial board), upon
the ground that to answer might tend to incriminate him or compel
him to be a witness against himself, or who refuses to waive im-
munity when called by a grand jury to testify upon such matters,
shall be removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall
forfeit his office at the suit of the attorney general if he is then
holding the same, and be disqualified from holding any public office,
trust or employmnet, for a period of five years; provided that if at
the time of any such refusal, said person is no longer holding such
office, trust or employm'ent, he shall be disqualified from holding
any public office, trust or employment for a period of five years.
Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall apply to persons
holding state offices for which the State Constitution provides exclu-
sive causes and methods for removal from office."
There can be no doubt that the refusal of a public officer to testify con-
cerning his office cannot be justified on moral grounds. Privilege permits
31 People v. Gillette, 111 N. Y. S. 133, 139 (1908).
32 Note (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 901.
33 Ill. Const. Art. II, §10: "1 No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself ... ''




the refusal, but to exercise the privilege is wholly inconsistent with the
official's public duty. A refusal to testify is a breach of the public trust and
on this ground should subject the official to dismissal.35 These arguments
have been upheld in several cases involving the dismissal of police officers
for refusal to waive their immunity, although it must be recognized that
in the case of policemen, whose direct duty is to detect and suppress
crime, there is more reason for calling a refusal to testify a dereliction
of duty.3 6 For officers other than policemen, the problem appears in a
somewhat different light, and few cases have arisen concerning them.
37
This type of statute has been adopted by no other states. New York
has included a similar provision in its constitution, probably to dispel
any possible doubts as to the constitutionality of the measure.3 8 In order
to avoid the most valid constitutional objection, the bill as presently
proposed would not extend to include those offices for which the con-
stitution specifies exclusive causes and methods of removal. 39 Although
the precedents, judicial or otherwise, on this question are few,40 the better
view seems to be that the legislature has power only to change the provi-
35 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2275(a); Note (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev.
1160 (discussing a statute similar to the one here considered).
36 Christal v. Police Commissioner of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P.
(2d) 416 (1939) ; Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 Atl. 245 (1931).
37 In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N. E. (2d) 543 (1941) involved a judge of the
municipal court of Chicago who refused to sign an immunity waiver when called
before the grand jury. In subsequent disbarment proceedings, the court held that
"unless the circumstances surrounding him or duties placed upon him are of such
character as to require, in honesty and good conscience, that he waive the right," a
person is not guilty of wrong should he claim it. 377 Ill. at 357, 36 N.E. (2d) at 548.
Recently, two police officers in Chicago were discharged by the Civil Service Com-
mission for invoking their constitutional privilege of immunity from self-incrimination
by refusing to sign an immunity waiver when called upon to testify before a grand
jury. On appeal, the Superior Court of Cook County quashed the record returned by
the Commission, and the two cases are now pending on appeal before the Appellate
Court. The Superior Court did not specifically reject the Commission's reasoning that
a refusal to testify would be grounds for discharge, but distinguished between a re-
fusal to testify and a refusal to sign a waiver, holding that the latter did not con-
stitute grounds for discharge. Drury v. Hurley, case No. 47-S17720 (1948); Connelly
v. Hurley, case No. 47-S17721 (1948). If a ruling is obtained by the Appellate or
Supreme Court that a refusal to testify is grounds for discharge under the Civil
Service Act, then there would be no need for this proposed statute as applied to
police officers and other civil service officers. For a discussion of these cases, see
Note (1948) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 613.
38 New York Const. Art. 1, §6. A similar provision has been included in the New
York City Charter, §903. The removal power has been exercised in at least two New
York cases. People v. Harris, 294 N. Y. 424, 63 N. E. (2d) 17 (1945); Canteline v.
McClellan, 282 N. Y. 166, 25 N.E. (2d) 972 (1940).
39 The Constitutional provisions for removal are as follows: Art. VI, §30, applies
to removal of judicial officers. The General Assembly may for cause remove from
office any judge by a / vote of each house. Other judicial officers shall be removed
from office on prosecution and final conviction for misdemeanor in office. Art. VI, §28
provides that justices of the peace in Chicago are removable by summary proceeding
in circuit or superior court for extortion or other malfeasance.
40 McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 109 (1868) ; State ex rel. Gibson v. Friedley, 135
Ind. 119, 34 N.E. 872 (1893); Commonwealth v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42 (1880). In
Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196 (1884), a statute was held unconstitutional
which allowed the Superintendent of Schools to be removed from office for partici-
pating in a political meeting. The court stated that a constitutional officer cannot
be removed from office for exercising any right guaranteed under the constitution.
In People v. Dreher, 302 Ill. 50, 56, 134 N.E. 22 (1922), the court stated: "There
is no prohibition, or limitation in the Constitution of this State on the power of the
legislature to prescribe the means by which officers, other than judicial officers, below
the grade of state officers may be removed from office."
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sions for removal for those offices over which it has some measure of
control. 41 It must be noted that the exception provided in the bill covers
only those offices for which the constitution provides both causes and
methods for removal which are exclusive, and does not, by its terms, ex-
tend to those state civil officers for which the constitution may provide
only a method for removal.
It has also been argued that the bill in effect nullifies the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination for the public officials involved.
They may exercise their privilege, but to do so involves the loss of their
primary livelihood. It can be said, however, that the bill will not deprive
any person of his constitutional right to refuse to testify, but does pro-
vide that no person serving the public can hide his criminality behind
that privilege and still hold public office. An official may assert his con-
stitutional right, but he has no constitutional right to hold his office.4 2
As originally worded in the version of this bill introduced in the 1947
session of the legislature, permanent disqualification from office was the
penalty for a refusal to testify. This disqualification has been reduced
to a period of five years to mitigate the harshness of the penalty. It is
necessary to have some such provision in the bill, since if there is not, the
purpose of the bill may be avoided by merely appointing the discharged
official to another position, or changing the name of his office. 43 It is pos-
sible to argue that a disqualification from future office is, in effect, estab-
lishing qualifications for holding public office. An objection can then be
raised that the qualifications for office as specified in the constitution are
exclusive, 44 but it would seem that such holdings have been in situations
involving non-moral qualifications, as where the period of residency
established by the constitution is changed by statute for a particular
office. Statutes prescribing the holding of public office by convicted felons
41 Mechem, The Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890) §457: ... where the
constitution provides that officers may be removed for a given cause, defining it in
terms which have a definite and well understood legal meaning, it is not competent
for the legislature to extend its scope by adding or incorporating offenses which do
not fall within that meaning. The statement of one cause is an implied prohibition to
the legislature's adding to it or extending it to other causes . . ." See Comment,
Claim of Immunity from Self-Incrimination by Public Officers (1930) 64 U. S. Law
Rev. 561; 8 Wigmore Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2275a.
42 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892) (police
officer discharged for taking active part in politics). It has been definitely estab-
lished that an official does not have a property right in his office. Preston v. Chicago,
246 Ill. 26, 92 N. E. 591 (1910) ; People ex rel. Gersch v. Chicago, 242 Ill. 561, 90
N.E. 259 (1909). See Note (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 1160.
43 This was done in New York after the constitutional amendment was adopted.
In People v. Harris, 294 N. Y. 424, 63 N.E. (2d) 17 (1945), Cassidy, the Commis-
sioner of Water Supply of Albany was removed for refusal to sign an immunity
waiver. The city officials thereupon created the office of Water Rent Delinquencies
and appointed Cassidy to that office at the same salary. As a result of this avoidance
of the constitutional amendment, a statute has been proposed in New York which
would disqualify the removed officer from all public offices for a specified period of
time.
44 People v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N. E. 1053 (1913) (statute held uncon-
stitutional which required five years residence in the county for county commis-
sioners) ; State v. Bateman, 162 N. C. 588, 77 S. E. 768 (1913) (statute requiring
recorder to be licensed attorney at law held unconstitutional). See Mechem, Public
Officers (1890) §96; 1 Story on the Constitution, 625. It is, of course, within the
power of the legislature to provide its own qualifications for offices whose qualifica-
tions are not set forth in the constitution or for offices created by the legislature.
People v. Olson, 245 Ill. 288, 291, 92 N. E. 157, 158 (1910).
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have never been attacked on this ground.45 If the disqualification be
viewed as a moral or character requirement for holding office, it would
not seem to contravene the exclusiveness of constitutional qualifications
for office.
From the standpoint of engendering in all public officials a higher
standard of public duty, as well as making investigations of malfeasance
in office much easier, such a statute would be clearly desirable. It would
have no application to the private affairs of public officials. It is diffi-
cult to see how such a statute could be misused, and the only opposition to
it could come from a personal fear of investigation. It is within the legis-
lative power to regulate against acts incompatible with a proper discharge
of the public official's duty,46 and this is a clear case where such power
should be exercised.
The Immunity Bill
Of all the bills here discussed the immunity bill is undoubtedly the
least controversial in nature. Its constitutiohal validity is beyond serious
challenge. Its effectiveness in the investigation of modern -large-scale
criminal activities has been widely recognized. 47 The legal principle upon
which it operates is embodied in many provisions scattered throughout
Illinois statute law, both in the Criminal Code and in various regulatory
measures.48 The proposed bill would empower the court on motion of the
state's attorney to grant general immunity to a material witness in any
grand jury investigation or at the trial of any offense, either felony or
misdemeanor, when the witness withholds evidence by asserting his con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 49 After grant of immu-
nity, persistence in his refusal to testify or produce evidence would
subject the recalcitrant witness to imprisonment for contempt for as long
as two years.50 At present the only criminal laws on the books which are
implemented in their enforcement by immunity clauses are the bribery
and labor extortion laws.5' Obviously there are many other crimes, such
as conspiracies generally, gambling, and election frauds, requiring the
participation of two or more persons, where a comprehensive immunity
statute would be of immense assistance in obtaining convictions otherwise
impossible. Although there exists in the absence of legislative authoriza-
tion some common-law support for a power in the prosecutor, either
alone or with the approval of the court, to offer immunity to one accom-,
45 ll. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §616.
46 People v. Loeffler, 175 fl1. 585, 51 NX. E. 785 (1898): "When offices are created
by statute, those offices are wholly within the control of the legislature which created
them." See People v. Dreher, 302 Ill. 50, 134 N. E. 22 (1922), supra note 39.
47 4 Wigrmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2284; Note (1920) 5 Iowa L. Bull. 175;
Note (1922) 12 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 381; Dession, Criminal Law Administra-
tion and Public Order (1948) 381.
48 I1. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §82 (Bribery and attempted bribery); Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1947) c. 38, §245 (labor extortion); cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §335 (disgorg-
ing illegal funds from gaming); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 63, §6 (testimony before the
General Assembly or a committee thereof) ; and statutes treating the following sub-
ject matters: Anti-trust and corporate officers; prostitution nuisance (injunctive
relief) ; insurance regulation; trucking; liquor control; cigarette tax; messages tax.
49 See note 32 supra.
50 A substantially similar bill was introduced at the 1947 session of the General
Assembly and was killed by the House Judiciary Committee, modified and presented
to the Senate, and there killed after being referred out of the Judiciary Committee
without recommendation.
51 Cited supra note 46.
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plice for testimony against another, the practice has apparently never
prevailed in Illinois and is elsewhere severely limited in its scope.5 2 In-
stead of the present crazy-quilt of special enactments affecting only
particular crimes and employing varied phraseology, the proposed im-
munity law, as set forth below, would make available to law enforcement
officials in all cases the authority to compel the production of incriminat-
ing matter from relatively minor offenders in the interest of obtaining
sufficient evidence to convict the major defendant. The bill provides as
follows:
"Whenever, in any investigation before a grand jury, or trial in a
court of record, of any person charged with a criminal offense (either
felony or misdemeanor) it shall appear to the court that any person
called as a witness in behalf of the prosecution is a material witness
and that his testimony or any evidence he may produce, documen-
tary or otherwise, would tend to incriminate him, on motion of the
State's Attorney the court may cause an order to be entered of record
that such witness be released from all liability to be prosecuted or
punished on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he may be required to testify or produce evidence, documen-
tary or otherwise, the order shall forever after be a bar to any
indictment, information or prosecution against the witness for any
felony or misdemeanor shown in whole or in part by such matter
except for perjury committed in the giving of such testimony. Any
witness, who, having been granted immunity as aforesaid, refuses
to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, may be
punished for contempt of the court and sentenced to the county jail
for not more than two years."
The general principle upon which all immunity provisions are based
is that the constitutional privilege against being compelled to testify
to facts which tend to incriminate the witness may be effectively annulled
if the penalty for the offense disclosed thereby is eliminated. If the sting
of criminality attaching to certain conduct is withdrawn as to a particu-
lar individual, it is as though the statute prescribing the punishment for
the offense in question had never been enacted. Thus the witness may be
compelled as in all other cases to testify to facts which to him are no
longer personally incriminating. On theory, the validity of such an ex-
change of privilege for immunity cannot be questioned.5 3 The practical
difficulty in drafting such a statute lies in making the immunity pre-
cisely co-extensive with the constitutional privilege which is to be abro-
gated. An amnesty broader than is absolutely necessary confers an
unwarranted "gratuity to crime.' ' 54 On the other hand, a grant of
52 Cf. People v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N. E. 181 (1927) (defendant testi-
fied against his accomplice after promise of immunity by prosecutor alone; held,
subsequent conviction of defendant could not stand). Usually the offer of immunity
by the prosecutor does not affect the privilege if the approval of the court is not
obtained. Ex parte Napoleon, 144 S. W. 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912); People v.
Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 Pac. 1033 (1923) (such private agreements are against
public policy). If the court does give its sanction, the promises are upheld. Ex Parte
Copeland, 240 S. W. 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922); State v. Ward, 112 W. Va. 552, 165
S. E. 803 (1932).
53 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27, 178 N.E.
384 (1931) ; Ex Parte Williams, 127 Cal. App. 424, 16 P. (2d) 172 (1932) ; 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2281 (traces principle as far back as 1725).
54 See Holmes, J., in Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
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immunity which leaves the witness exposed to subsequent prosecution
based in whole or in part on revelations made during his forced dis-
closures would be constitutionally objectionable. If the witness were not
offered sufficient protection from the legal consequences of offenses which
he might bring to light, he could refuse, as before, to testify, and the
purpose of the statute would be frustrated.55
There are two distinct types of immunity provisions in effect in Illinois
at this time. One type of statute merely confers protection against the
use of the evidence given under testimonial compulsion as the basis for
any subsequent prosecution.56 This means only that the record of the
testimony given at the earlier hearing will not later be offered in evidence
against the witness. It does not shield him against evidence which is
unearthed as a result of clues furnished by the testimony at the first
hearing. Though the question of whether one may be compelled under
such a statute to reveal incriminating facts has not been answered in
Illinois, it has been answered in the negative elsewhere under similar
constitutional limitations. 57 The second type of statute removes liability
for punishment "on account of any transaction, matter, or thing" testi-
fied to by the witness. It accords immunity in the most sweeping fashion
possible, not only for the crime actually inquired about but also for those
crimes incidentally revealed during the course of the testimony.5 8 Such
scope is clearly necessary to provide an adequate substitute for the privi-
lege which is to be taken away.59 This latter type of statute is the model
after which the proposed immunity bill is drawn. In order to prevent the
witness from pouring out all his past derelictions, whether relevant to
the matter at issue or not, and thus securing in effect a pardon for each
past offense, the instant bill would authorize extension of immunity only
as to those offenses "concerning which he may be required to testify."
55 The question of the extent of immunity conferred by the statute can arise in
one of two ways: (a) the accused has made disclosure of a separate offense, and is
later charged with it, and then pleads an immunity gained by his disclosure, or, (b)
accused refuses disclosure of the other offense alleging it to be a separate one, there-
fore not covered by the immunity and therefore still privileged. The decision should
be the same whichever way the question arises. Cf. People v. Argo, 237 Ill. 173, 86
N.E. 679 (1908) ; Re Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 63, §6. Cf. People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74 (1861).
57 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) ; Ex Parte Carter, 166 Mo. 604,
66 S. W. 540 (1902); Commonwealth v. Frank, - Pa. Super. -, 48 A. (2d) 10
(1946).
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §82 (bribery). It was held originally that this im-
munity only extended to subsequent prosecutions for bribery based on derivative evi-
dence. People v. Argo, 237 Ill. 173, 86 N.E. 679 (1908). This holding was later
overruled sub silencie in People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 144 N. E. 342 (1924), extending
the immunity granted in §82 to offenses revealed which "relate to the charge of
bribery." The pertinent language of the proposed bill is ". . . shall be a bar to
prosecution . . . for any felony or misdemeanor shown in whole or in part by such
matter." For constitutional purposes this scope of protection is said to be essential.
People v. Rockola, 342 Ill. 27, 178 N. E. 384 (1931). But of. People v. Sharp, 107
N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1887) (valid if only a bar against subsequent bribery prose-
cutions).
59 See People v. Spain, 307 fI1. 283, 284, 138 N.E. 614 (1923) ("the rule is frmly
established that if the proposed evidence has a tendancy to incriminate the witness
or to establish a link in the chain of evidence which may lead to his conviction or if
the proposed evidence will disclose the names of persons upon whose testimony the




The bill does not cover voluntary admissions not demanded by the in-
terrogator.60
To attain the ideal of co-extensiveness with constitutional privilege, the
statutory grant of immunity should be used solely to overcome an obsta-
cle, i.e., a meritorious refusal to answer to a particular line of inquiry.61
It should not be used where the desired information can be had volun-
tarily or where the witness' evidence is not truly privileged. 62 A common
example of the wasteful use of the immunity power is presented by the
typical clause in acts setting up legislative investigating committees and
some administrative agencies.63 Once the witness or his private records
are subpoenaed he is automatically insulated from prosecution for any-
thing he might divulge at the hearing.64 He need not make a specific
claim of privilege once on the stand. Under this type of statute the
prosecutor is at a disadvantage since he does not know whether, or to
what extent, a witness may have participated in a crime; and so runs
the risk of unintentionally affording immunity. The proposed immunity
bill does, however, take advantage of the requirement of timely assertion
of privilege. It provides that the court may order that the witness be
rendered immune from future prosecution if it appears that evidence
that the witness can produce will tend to incriminate him. Thus it is rea-
sonable to assume that this extraordinary power which would be vested
in the court would be used sparingly and only to obtain evidence which
would not be available under ordinary process.6 5
6o This assumes that the witness has already claimed his privilege and that the
court has ordered that the immunity be granted. The witness' answers would have to be
responsive to the question or they could be stricken; the prosecutor's questions would
presumably be relevant to the facts in issue, the result being that only those utter-
ances of the witness which are essential to the particular trial or investigation will be
protected. Even though there were no express provision to that effect, the immunity
would not logically extend to perjury. People v. Kramer, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (1939).
Also, if after grant of immunity the witness in fact said nothing that tended to con-
vict him of crime the immunity might be held not to have attached. See Carchidi v.
State, 187 Wise. 438, 204 N. W. 473 (1925).
61 The privilege may be waived if not seasonably asserted. Comment (1940) 49
Yale L. J. 1059; Annotation, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Before Grand
Jury (1923) 27 A. L. R. 139. The trial judge has the last word on whether the evi-
dence the witness desires to withhold is actually damaging. For the classic formula
as expressed by Marshall, C. J., see In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (C. C. Va. 1807).
62 E.g., Corporate records, Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
63 For example, in 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended, 50 USCA Appendix, §901 et
seq.; 1l. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §245 ("1No person shall be excused from attending,
testifying and producing any books, papers, documents or other evidence in obedi-
ence to a subpoena served at the instance of the Attorney General or of the State's
attorney bqfore any court, magistrate, or grand jury, upon any investigation, pro-
ceeding or trial for a violation of the provisions of this act, upon the ground, or
for the reason that the testimony or evidence .... required of him, may tend to
criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, etc.").
64 United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943); Note (1943) 41 Mich. L. Rev.
1199; In re Grand Jury, 135 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1912) (immunity waiver ineffective).
Contra: People ex rel. Roach v. Carter, 297 Mich. 577, 298 N. W. 288 (1941) ; cases
collected in Note (1937) 10 So. Calif. L. Rev. 344.
65 For instance, documentary evidence which is incriminating to the person produc-
ing it may be compelled under the proposed statute. If the papers are records re-
quired to be kept by law, they may well not be privileged at all, and thus may be
compelled under ordinary process. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948).
The immunity provision of the act under which the General Assembly and its com-
mittees conduct investigations has a proviso relating to non-privileged records so as to
prevent the extension of immunity thereto. Ill. Rev. stat. (1947) c. 63, §6. For an
example of an imprudent conference of immunity where it was not demanded, see
People v. Finklestein, 299 III. App. 363, 20 N.E. (2d) 290 (1939) (corporate books).
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The mosi serious objection taken to immunity statutes as a class is
based on defects in our complex and interlocking federal system. It is
that no one sovereign can immunize a witness against prosecution at the
hands of another sovereign, violation of whose law may also bb revealed
by the evidence given under grant of immunity. This objection may be
more fully appreciated when it is remembered how inextricably the fed-
eral tax laws are bound up with normal business activity. Tax evasion
and criminality under state laws often go hand in hand. Yet conceding
the weight of such an argument, few courts have accepted it,66 and the
United States Supreme Court has recently held that it is not a violation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege to base a federal conviction on evi-
dence obtained from a defendant in a state court under grant of im-
munity.67
That the statute would be an efficient tool in the investigation of crimes
where chief reliance must be placed on the testimony of persons actually
implicated can be little doubted. That the present distribution of im-
munity clauses throughout the statute books is illogical is apparent. No
reason is seen why this device should not be utilized in the enforcement
of all the criminal'laws. The exercise of the power to grant immunity
from future prosecution is amply restricted by giving it primarily to the
trial judge, and by the requirement that the witness' testimony be mate-
rial to the cause being tried or investigated. Further, only witnesses on
behalf of the prosecution can be clothed with immunity. It would thus
be impossible for a witness, aided by the defense attorney, to give testi-
mony on behalf of the defense which would incriminate him and yet
which would clear the accused-with the result that both would escape
punishment.68 The late Dean Wigmore recommended a similar bill almost
twenty-five years ago, calling it a "valuable and satisfactory aid to
investigation and prosecution of crim6."69 It is high time this salutary
measure was enacted into law.
The Grand Jury Bill
"At common law the grand jury expired with the term, and no statute
has changed this rule or authorized any court to continue a grand jury
beyond the adjournment of the term." 70 So spoke the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1923 and its words still accurately describe the situation that
exists today. Moreover, the Criminal Court of Cook County, where the
case arose which provoked the Court's observation, still has a term of
court which expires at the end of a month, in contrast with other counties
in the state whose terms range from three to six months.71 Thus Cook
66 Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905) (testimony compelled under grant of im-
munity with federal prosecution probable; no violation of any federal constitutional
right) ; United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) ("The principle is well
established that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule
against self-incrimination"). But of. In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652
(1940) ("To overcome the privilege, the extent of the immunity would have to be of
such a nature that it would protect not only against state prosecution but also
against any reasonably probable federal prosecution"); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742,
295 N. W. 483 (1940).
67 Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944).
68 Note (1939) 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 160.
69 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2284.
70 People v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 142 N. E. 208 (1923).
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) e. 37, §724 et. seq.
1949]
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
County, the most heavily populated and highly urbanized county in all
the state, has a grand jury which because of its abnormally short life is
unable to maintain the vigorous and prolonged investigation which is
requisite to cope with modern organized crime.
A statutory change is certainly indicated, and the following bill has
been proposed:
".. . provided, further that in counties having a population of more
than two hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, the names of the per-
sons to constitute the regular and supplemental panels shall be
drawn in the manner provided for the drawing of names of persons
to serve as petit jurors in such counties; the twenty-three names to
provide the regular panel shall be first drawn, and thereupon twenty
names for the supplemental panel shall be drawn and listed on that
panel in the order in which they are drawn; provided that in counties
having a population of more than five hundred thousand inhabi-
tants, the court on petition of the State's Attorney or upon its own
motion may extend the term of any grand jury for a period of thirty
days; provided that no grand jury shall serve in excess of six.
months; and, provided that the existence of an extended grand jury
shall not affect the impanelling, existence or power of the regular
grand jury; and, provided further that there shall be no more than
one s'uch extended grand jury and one regular grand jury in exist-
ence in any one of said counties at the same time."' 72 (New matter
italicized.)
The foregoing grand jury bill would seem to meet the Cook County
problem admirably.73 It would empower the court in counties having a
population of over 500,000 to extend the term of any grand jury thirty
days, for a total permissible life of six months. Only one such extended
grand jury could be in existence in one county at the same time, although
the proposed enactment expressly allows the impaneling of the regular
grand jury to proceed as heretofore. Presumably the power to call a
statutory special grand jury would likewise not be impaired.
Legislative action pertaining to grand juries presents the only solution
to this constantly recurring problem. Attempts in the past by court
order alone to hold over a grand jury past its prescribed term so that it
could conclude important business have not been legally satisfactory. If
no regular grand jury is impaneled at the beginning of the new term and
the preceding grand jury is held over to continue its deliberations, the
Supreme Court has held that it has at least a de facto existence and may
initiate contempt proceedings against a witness that refuses to testify
before it.74 It is very doubtful, however, whether such a body could re-
turn indictments which could withstand a timely motion to quash or a
challenge to the array.75 But if a regular grand jury is summoned to
72 In form, an amendment to the Juror's Act, I1. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 78, §9.
73 The bill as originally introduced in 1947 passed the Senate but was defeated in
the House Executive Committee, and read as follows: ". . .provided that in the
Criminal Court of Cook County, the Court shall order one or more grand juries to be
summoned at such times as the public interest may require to serve until discharged
by the Court, but not to exceed six months."
74 People v. Cochrane, 307 II1. 126, 138 N. E. 291 (1923).
75 The defendant in the Cochrane case, cited supra note 73, raised the question of
illegality of the grand jury proceedings too late and thus was barred procedurally.
No opinion was expressed on the effect of a timely assertion of illegality. But cf.
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sit contemporaneously to handle the routine business of returning indict-
ments, the continued grand jury has not even the power to compel testi-
mony.7 6 There is thus no common-law power in the court to prolong the
life of a particular grand jury.77 True, there is statutory authority for
the calling of special grand juries when the court "is of the opinion that
public justice requires it."78 Contrary to the holdings by the appellate
courts of some other states, 79 the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
there is no constitutional barrier to legislative creation of any number of
grand juries to function in the same county simultaneously.8 0 Neverthe-
less, insofar as the special statutory grand jury is still a constituent part
of the court which impanels and charges it,81 it has been said that it
suffers from the same infirmity of abbrevated existence as the regular
body. Therfore in Cook County it could probably function no longer than
a month. 82
It should be noted, however, that were the reform proposed by this bill
enacted the Criminal Court of Cook County would still possess far less
power with respect to the number and tenure of outstanding grand juries
than was vested in the federal district courts by the Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1938.83 It may be objected that the bill by in effect singling
out Cook County runs afoul of the State Constitutional provision against
"local or special" laws affecting the summoning and impaneling of grand
juries.84 There is small merit in this contention, however. In the first
place, the bill does not purport to affect the procedure of selecting and
calling grand juries as such.85 It only permits the regularly constituted
grand jury to serve as long as the maximum term of court allowable
under the Illinois Constitution.86 Secondly, a law is not considered
"special" because it classifies counties on the basis of population, if the
number of inhabitants creates substantial difference in the needs con-
cerning the subject of the legislation.8 7 There would seem to be an
obvious relationship between the number and life of grand juries and the
population of the district wherein they function.8 8 Certainly no legiti-
State v. Noyes, 87 Wis. 340, 58 N. W. 386 (1894) ; People v. Morgan, 133 Mich. 550,
95 N.W. 542 (1903).
76 People v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 142 N. E. 208 (1924).
77 Accord, Riley v. State, 209 Ala. 505, 96 So. 599 (1923); 38 C. J. S. Grand
Juries, §32 p. 1022; Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal (1947), c.
IV, p. 155.
78 I1. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 78, §19. See Steiner, Impaneling a Grand Jury in
Illinois (1936) 2 J. M. L. Q. 63.
79 See Opinion to the Governor, 62 R. I. 200, 4 A. (2d) 487 (1939).
80 People ex rel. Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
81 People v. McCauley, 256 Ill. 504, 100 N. E. 182 (1912).
82 See Peterson, The Grand Jury-Voice of Democracy, Criminal Justice, January
1944. But cf. Chamberlin, Special Grand Juries in Illinois (1930) 22 J. of Crim. L.
& Criminology 163, 169. Although there are three courts of the same "9grade" in Cook
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